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The role of prospection in steep 
temporal reward discounting in 
gambling addiction
Antonius Wiehler *, Uli Bromberg and Jan Peters 
Department of Systems Neuroscience, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany
Addiction and pathological gambling (PG) have been consistently associated with high 
impulsivity and a steep devaluation of delayed rewards, a process that is known as 
temporal discounting (TD). Recent studies indicated that enhanced episodic future 
thinking (EFT) results in less impulsive TD in healthy controls (HCs). In a separate line of 
research, it has been suggested that non-linearities in time perception might contribute 
to reward devaluation during inter-temporal choice. Therefore, in addition to deficits in 
valuation processes and executive control, impairments in EFT and non-linearities in time 
perception have been hypothesized to contribute to steep TD in addiction. In this study, 
we explore such a potential association of impairments in EFT and time perception with 
steep TD in PG. We investigated 20 PGs and 20 matched HCs. TD was assessed via a 
standard computerized binary choice task. EFT was measured using a variation of the 
Autobiographical Memory Interview by Levine et al. (1). Time perception was assessed 
with a novel task, utilizing a non-linear rating procedure via circle-size adjustments. 
Groups did not differ in baseline EFT. In both groups, a power law accounted time per-
ception best, and the degree of non-linearity in time perception correlated with discount-
ing across groups. A multiple regression analysis across all predictors and covariates 
revealed that only group status (PG/HC) and depression were significantly associated 
with discounting behavior such that PG increased TD and depression attenuated TD. 
Our findings speak against the idea that steep TD in PG is due to a skewed perception of 
time or impairments in EFT, at least under the present task conditions. The lack of overall 
group differences in EFT does not rule out the possibility of more complex interactions 
of EFT and decision-making. These interactions might be diminished in pathological 
gambling or addiction more generally, when other task configurations are used.
Keywords: addiction, pathological gambling, temporal discounting, delay discounting, autobiographical memory, 
episodic future thinking, time perception
introduction
Throughout life, we are faced with numerous choices between tempting immediate rewards and larger 
rewards that are associated with some delay. Such future rewards are typically devalued (discounted) 
over time, a phenomenon referred to as temporal (or delay) discounting [TD (2, 3)]. Although there 
is considerable variability in TD in healthy humans (4), addiction in particular is reliably associated 
with steep reward discounting (2). Patients suffering from substance-based addictions such as opioid 
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(5, 6), cocaine (7), and nicotine addiction (8) as well as those suf-
fering from non-substance-based addictions such as pathological 
gambling (PG) show increased TD (9–12). Although steep TD is 
consistently observed in gambling addiction (10), the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms are still unclear. For example, impairments 
in reward valuation processes and a lack of executive control 
might both contribute to steep discounting.
When faced with a decision between rewards, agents assign a 
subjective value to each option and compare options by compar-
ing those values (13). An impaired valuation process in PG could 
be one possible contributing factor for impulsive decisions and 
steep TD in PG. Valuation processes are reflected in neuronal 
valuation signals in the brain’s rewards circuits (14). It is an 
ongoing debate whether value signals in, for example, the ventral 
striatum are decreased or increased in PG (15). While the reward 
deficiency hypothesis states that addiction is associated with 
diminished striatal value signals (16), an idea supported by some 
studies (17–19), other studies have found the opposite effect (20, 
21). PG has been associated with higher levels of brain-derived 
neurotrophic factor (BDNF), which regulates midbrain dopamine 
release (22, 23). This effect was not associated with addiction 
severity (22). Monetary rewards might affect the reward system of 
PGs differently depending on the context and that the relation to 
non-monetary rewards is important. Given these mixed results, it 
cannot be ruled out that steep TD in PG is caused by disturbances 
in valuation processes.
Executive control is thought to be crucial to resist tempting 
immediate rewards. Thus, in addiction to deficits in reward 
valuation, executive control impairments might be an additional 
explanation for steep TD in PG. There is evidence for impair-
ments of executive control in PG in a Stroop task and changes of 
the related neuronal activity in the left ventro-medial prefrontal 
cortex were reported (24). PG shares increased TD impulsivity 
with substance-use disorders [SUDs (25, 26)], but executive 
functions in general seem to be less impaired in comparison to 
SUDs. Nevertheless, these findings provide evidence that execu-
tive control in PG might be impaired in comparison to healthy 
control (HC) participants.
It has been speculated earlier (27) that one process that might 
support future-oriented decision-making in humans is episodic 
future thinking [EFT (28–30), sometimes also referred to as 
prospection]. The concept of EFT is closely linked to episodic 
memory. Episodic memory caches personal experiences and 
allows for “mental time travel” into the past (30–32). Episodic 
memory and personal semantic memory together constitute 
autobiographical memory [AM (1)]. A standard procedure to 
measure AM is the Autobiographical Memory Interview [AMI 
(1)], which assesses memories of personal events and differenti-
ates between episodic memory and semantic information. In 
recent studies, variations of the AMI have been used to asses 
EFT as well [e.g., in Ref. (33)]. Recent cognitive neuroscience 
findings suggest that the same neuro-cognitive system consist-
ing of medial temporal, parietal, and medial prefrontal networks 
supports projections of the self into the past and into the future 
(28–30, 32, 34–36). In accordance with this observation, AM 
and EFT are typically jointly impaired in many neurological 
and psychiatric disorders, e.g., in mild cognitive impairment 
(37), Alzheimer’s disease (38), hippocampal amnesia (39), and 
medial temporal lobe damage (33), as well as in, e.g., autism 
(40), post-traumatic stress disorder (41), and schizophrenia (42). 
However, given that steep discounting is critical to addiction 
psychopathology (for example, it is also associated with clinical 
relevant parameters such as relapse (43–45), it is surprising that 
relatively little is known about potential AM and EFT impair-
ments in addiction in general and PG in particular. A recent 
study by Mercuri et al. (46) found impairments in EFT, but not 
in AM in a group of opioid addicts. Alcohol and opioid addicts 
use shorter time horizons in an imagination task (47, 48), but it 
is unclear if steep reward discounting in addiction is associated 
with impairments in EFT.
There is growing evidence that TD depends on and interacts 
with EFT. EFT, as measured by episodic details generated in the 
AMI, predicts TD rates in healthy adolescents (49). Moreover, 
it has been shown that TD and EFT interact both in terms of 
behavior and neuronal systems. Cueing EFT during a TD task 
led to less impulsive decisions and this change in behavior was 
associated with coupling of neuronal signals in the anterior cin-
gulate cortex and the hippocampus (50). Likewise, participants 
are more willing to wait for rewards after vividly imagining the 
consumption of a delayed reward (51), an effect mediated by 
the medial rostral prefrontal cortex. However, also unspecific 
and relatively general imaginations about the future can lead 
to attenuated TD behavior (52). Additionally, a recent study 
reported that patients suffering from hippocampal damage do 
not show attenuate discounting when cued with EFT informa-
tion, unlike HC participants (53). By contrast, TD behavior itself 
seems to be relatively unaffected by episodic amnesia (54, 55), 
suggesting that EFT might modulate TD, but is not a necessary 
process for TD. It has been suggested that EFT might affect TD 
not by modulation option values but by shortening the time 
horizon in general (56). This might explain why even relatively 
unspecific EFT interventions can influence TD choice behavior 
(52, 56).
It has been proposed that time perception is non-linear, which 
might contribute to the hyperbolic (rather than linear or expo-
nential) shape of the discounting function, such that discounting 
is steeper over near vs. far time intervals (57–60). There is some 
evidence for impairments in time perception in the range of sec-
onds to minutes in addicts (61). However, whether this extends 
to longer time spans relevant to discounting tasks (e.g., days to 
months) remains unclear. An altered subjective perception of 
time delays might at least partly explain the steeper TD in PG. 
Thus, a reliable assessment of time perception is important. We 
developed a novel task to assess the time perception of PGs in 
comparison to HC participants.
Given the separate evidence for interactions of TD with EFT 
and for steeper TD in addiction, it has been hypothesized that 
steeper TD, for example in gambling addiction, might, at least 
partly, be explained by EFT deficits (10). In the present study, we 
directly explore such a potential association. EFT was assessed 
using a modified version of the AMI (1), and TD was assessed 
using standard decision tasks. Additionally, we hypothesize that 
an altered subjective perception of time delays might contribute to 
steeper TD in addiction (62). Here, we examine time perception 
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in gambling addicts and healthy participants using a novel task. 
We examined a group of gambling addicts and a group of HC 
participants matched for age, education, and smoking status.
Materials and Methods
Participants
We investigated 20 participants fulfilling the DSM-5 criteria of 
pathological gambling [age mean (range) = 32.9 (19–59), 19 males] 
and 20 healthy control participants [age mean (range) =  32.55 
(18–58), 19 males]. Both groups were matched for age, educa-
tion (completed school years), and smoking behavior assessed 
with the Fagerstrom test for nicotine dependence [FTND (63), 
see Table 1 for a sample overview]. We recruited all participants 
via advertisements on local internet bulletin boards. Participants 
received 10 EUR per hour as a compensation for participation. 
All participants provided written informed consent to par-
ticipate. The local Institutional review board (Hamburg Board of 
Physicians) approved all study procedures.
general Procedure
Testing of EFT might induce a future-oriented mindset, which 
could affect TD (56). To avoid such carry-over effects, TD was 
always tested first, followed by the time perception and circle-size 
rating procedure. Then, EFT and AM were assessed before finally 
all questionnaire-based measures were completed. Testing took 
about 3 h in total.
Psychological assessment
Severity of gambling addiction was assessed by the 
“Kurzfragebogen zum Glücksspielverhalten” [KFG (64)] and a 
German adaptation of the south oaks gambling screen [SOGS 
(65)]. Depression is a common co-morbidity in pathological 
gambling (66) and was assessed using the Beck Depression 
Inventory (67). Nicotine addiction was measured with the FTND 
(63), and alcohol consumption was measured with the alcohol 
use disorders identification test [AUDIT (68)].
TaBle 1 | Overview about tested sample and matching statistics.
hc Pg group comparison
Age median (range) 32.55 
(18–58)
32.90 
(19–59)
t37.88 = 0.09, p = 0.93
Education in school 
years median (range)
10 (9–13) 10 (9–13) t38 = 0.74, p = 0.47
Monthly income in 
EUR mean (SD)
1042.90 
(452.54)
1279.70 
(1070.48)
t25.58 = 0.91, p = 0.37
FTND mean (SD) 3.5 (2.59) 4.45 (2.76) t37.84 = 1.12, p = 0.27
AUDIT mean (SD) 7.15 (7.37) 10.3 (6.28) t37.07 = 1.45, p = 0.15
DSM-IV pathological 
gambling mean (SD)
0.1 (0.31) 5.75 (1.74) t20.18 = 14.27, p < 0.001
KFG mean (SD) 1.75 (2.71) 30.15 (7.74) t23.60 = 15.48, p < 0.001
SOGS mean (SD) 0.45 (0.60) 9.65 (3.01) t20.53 = 13.39, p < 0.001
BDI mean (SD) 4.6 (4.07) 16.5 (9.48) t25.77 = 5.16, p < 0.001
HC, Healthy control participants; PG, Pathological gamblers; SD, standard deviation; 
FTND, Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence; AUDIT, Alcohol Use Disorders 
Identification Test; KFG, Kurzfragebogen zum Glücksspielverhalten (a measure of 
gambling addiction); SOGS, South Oaks Gambling Screen; BDI, Beck Depression 
Inventory (see Materials and Methods for details).
autobiographical Memory interview  
for Past and Future events
We assessed AM and EFT using a procedure similar to a 
study by Race and colleagues (33), based on the AMI (1). 
For EFT, participants were asked to imagine five events that 
could happen one year from now. To ensure comparability 
across participants, five short, unspecific cues were given (e.g., 
“Imagine someone special is visiting you one year from now. 
Describe in as much detail as you can what this event will be 
like. Describe where and when this event will be, who is there, 
how you feel, and what you are thinking”). Following each cue, 
the participant was asked to verbalize cue-related imagination 
for a maximum of 3 min. As soon as the participant finished, 
a standardized follow-up question was asked: “Can you tell 
me any more about where and when the event is taking place, 
who is there, how you feel, and what you are thinking?” For 
AM, participants were asked to recall and elaborate on five 
autobiographical episodes that happened a year ago. Again, to 
ensure comparability across participants, these episodes were 
cued (e.g., “Imagine a trip one year ago. Describe in as much 
detail as you can what this event was like. Describe where and 
when this event happened, who was there, how you felt, and 
what you were thinking.”) Again, elaborations were limited to 
3 min. AM reports were followed by the same follow-up ques-
tion as in the EFT condition.
All reports were recorded and transcribed. Due to technical 
reasons, only a subset of two (instead of five) AM events was 
recorded for one PG participant. All other participants completed 
all measures. In line with recent studies that applied the AMI (33, 
38, 39, 69–72), reports were subsequently scored by one rater 
according to the AMI manual (1) to disentangle episodic from 
semantic content. Each informational detail was classified into 
one of several categories. The scoring manual differentiates sub-
categories of episodic details: “Internal Event Details,” “Internal 
Place Details,” “Internal Time Details,” “Internal Perceptual 
Details,” and “Internal Emotion/Thought Details,” as well as 
semantic details (semantic information about the event) and 
external details. Details were rated as external if they fulfill the 
criteria of episodic details but belong to events other than the 
tested one (1). To assess the reliability of the rating procedure, two 
more raters scored a subset of 60 events. The overall inter-rater 
reliability was high (Cronbach’s α = 0.94).
Time Perception
Time perception was assessed using a novel task. Based on the 
assumption that time perception might be non-linear (57, 58, 
73–75), we developed a task without an obvious linear structure 
(e.g., a bounded linear pen and paper scale might allow par-
ticipants to be consistent across items, as a linear scaling of time 
perception could be mimicked by linear scaled answers). This 
might lead to more linear ratings because of the item arrange-
ment and would be unrelated to delay perception. We therefore 
measured time perception via a manual adjustment of circle sizes. 
The procedure included two tasks: a time perception task to assess 
subjective time perception and a circle-size rating task to control 
for potential non-linearities (or individual differences) in circle 
time perception.
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Time Perception Task
All tasks were implemented in the Presentation software pack-
age (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.) on a standard personal 
computer. On a square subsection of the computer screen, a 
delay was displayed in the lower part as a text (see Figure  1). 
Participants were then asked to adjust the size (via arrow but-
tons) of a centrally presented circle according to their subjective 
perception of the respective duration of the delay. Pressing the 
right button enlarged the circle, pressing the left button shrank 
the circle. Circle size could expand beyond the screen, but scaling 
stopped shortly before the circle filled the complete screen. If the 
delay was perceived as short, participants were asked to shrink the 
circle. If the delay was perceived as long, participants were asked 
to enlarge the circle.
We tested 18 delays, ranging from 1 day to 190 days. The set of 
tested delays was unknown to the participants in advance. Delays 
were split into two symmetric testing sets, starting either with the 
shortest or the longest delay, separated by a 20 s break. Note that 
ceiling effects might induce non-linearity in the ratings. Ceiling 
effects could occur if short delay periods at the beginning of the 
testing session were rated as long (large circle sizes), leaving little 
space for longer delays. To avoid this, a rating using more than 
90% of the scale led to longer delays being excluded from further 
testing. To avoid impulsive answers, proceeding to the next trial 
required a minimum of 10 s waiting period.
Circle-Size Estimation Task
Perception of circle sizes might in itself be non-linear and may 
confound the rating of delays. To address this issue, circle sizes 
were rated in a separate task. First, a circle touching all screen 
boundaries was shown to the participant and defined as a size of 
100%. On each trial, participants were then asked to adjust a circle 
like the time perception task described in the previous section. 
However, instead of delays, target sizes in percent were shown, 
i.e., the circle had to be adjusted in size relative to the reference 
circle shown in the beginning. Participants had to rate all sizes of 
the time perception sessions, as well as standard reference sizes 
at 20, 40, 60, 80%. Again, the circle diameter was the dependent 
variable. Ratings of the circle-rating test were used to transform 
time perception ratings and to clean time perception ratings from 
influences of circle-size perception.
A B C
FigUre 1 | (a): Time perception task. Participants are asked to adjust the 
circle size in accordance to their estimation of subjective waiting time. Larger 
circles are indicating longer subjective waiting time. (B): 100% reference circle 
presented before the circle-size estimation task. (c): Circle-size estimation 
task. Participants are asked to adjust circle sizes in reference to the 
presented 100% reference circle (B). See Section “Materials and Methods” 
for further details.
Delay Discounting
Delay discounting was tested with an adaptive task as described 
in previous studies (11, 76). Participants made repeated choices 
between a fixed smaller-but-sooner (SS) reward (20 EUR imme-
diately) and varying larger-but-later (LL) rewards. Delays of LL 
rewards ranged from 1 day to 180 days in seven steps. Amounts 
of LL rewards were adjusted via a staircase procedure to converge 
at participant-specific indifference points for all seven delays (76). 
A second discounting task included trials by Kirby et al. (6, 77), 
consisting of 27 fixed items.
cognitive Modeling
Time Perception – Model Selection and  
Parameter Estimation
Time perception ratings were analyzed individually for every 
participant. Adapting techniques from maximum likelihood 
estimation in linear regression, ratings for every delay were mod-
eled using a linear function ( y a x bˆ   *    = + ), a quadratic func-
tion ( y a x b x cˆ   *   *    2= + + ), and a power function [ y a xˆ    * b= , 
see also Ref. (57, 58)]. We assumed for every model that the 
observed ratings (y) are a combination of the true rating yˆ  and 
a constant error ϵ. Thus, we assumed the observed rating y to be 
Gaussian distributed with the true mean yˆ  and a participant-
specific precision parameter π (i.e., inverse variance). All 
parameters were assumed to be constant within a participant. 
Posterior distributions for each participant were estimated with 
a Bayesian statistics approach, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) simulations in a Gibbs sampler [JAGS 3.3.0 (78)]. For 
more detail of the Bayesian model, see Figure 2A. All cognitive 
modeling of time perception was done in a single participant 
fashion to allow for a participant-specific assessment of good-
ness of model fit. Therefore, we calculated deviance information 
criteria [DIC (79)] for every model and every participant. DIC 
is a common criterion to estimate the goodness of model fit in 
Bayesian modeling, where smaller values indicate a better fit 
(79–81).
Circle-Rating – Model Selection and Parameter 
Estimation
Ratings of circle sizes were modeled with the same procedure 
as the time perception ratings using the same model equations. 
Again, posterior distributions of parameters were estimated using 
MCMC.
Temporal Discounting – Adaptive Testing
We analyzed participant’s choices in the TD tasks using a 
two-level cognitive model, where individual participant model 
parameters are assumed to be drawn from a common group-level 
distribution (see Figure 2B). In accordance with prior research 
(11, 82), we used a hyperbola to describe the decay of subjective 
value across time:
 A
k D
SV=
1 *+
 (1)
where SV is the subjective value of the presented larger-but-later 
(LL) reward, A is the amount of the LL reward in Euro, k is the 
participant-specific discounting parameter, and D is the delay 
AB
FigUre 2 | (a) Graphical description of the Bayesian model fit for time 
perception ratings and circle-size ratings. yˆ  is calculated with either a linear, 
a quadratic, or a power function, with the respective participant-specific 
parameters a, b, and c (see Materials and Methods in the text for more 
details). π is the participant-specific precision parameter and y is 
the measured ratings of the participant. (B) Graphical description of the 
Bayesian model fit for temporal discounting. μβ is the group mean prior 
of the β parameter and λβ is the respected precision parameter. μk is the 
group mean prior of the k parameter and λk is the respected precision 
parameter. Participant-specific β and k parameters are drawn from separate 
group distributions for HC and PG. β and k parameters determine the choice 
probability p in every trial, which is connected to the actual choice y. 
Shaded nodes indicate observed variables, while latent nodes are 
non-shaded. Round nodes are continuous quantities and squared nodes are 
discrete quantities. Double-bordered nodes are fully determined by their 
parent nodes.
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of the LL reward in days. Second, the subjective value of the LL 
reward and the value of the 20 EUR immediate reward were 
passed to a softmax function to calculate choice probabilities 
for every trial:
 ( )
( )
( )
=
+
p
exp SV /
exp SV / exp SV /LL
LL
LL SS
β
β β  (2)
Here, pLL is the probability to choose the LL option on a 
given trial, SVLL and SVSS are the subjective values of the LL and 
smaller-but-sooner options, and β is the subject-specific decision 
noise parameter. Participant-specific k and β parameters were 
estimated using a hierarchical Bayesian approach with separate 
group-level distributions for healty control participants and 
pathological gamblers (see Figure  2B for an overview of the 
estimation scheme). Hierarchical Bayesian estimation has been 
shown to result in more reliable parameter estimates compared 
to maximum likelihood approaches by sharing information 
among participants during the sampling process and providing 
measures of uncertainty for every parameter (83, 84). We used 
empirical prior distributions taken from previous studies of TD 
in pathological gamblers and HCs (11, 85).
Temporal Discounting – Task by Kirby et al.
TD choices of the Kirby et al. task (77) were analyzed with the 
same procedure as the choices of the adaptive TD task.
AB
D
C
FigUre 3 | (a) Correlations of the number of internal details reported in the 
autobiographical memory (AM) condition with the number of internal details 
reported in the episodic future thinking (EFT) condition, separate for healthy 
control participants (HCs, r = 0.86, p < 0.001) and pathological gamblers 
(PGs, r = 0.95, p < 0.001). (B) Group difference in the number of internal 
details in the EFT condition. HC: healthy control participants, PG: pathological 
gamblers. Error bars are indicating SEM. (c) Correlation of number of internal 
details in the EFT condition with addiction severity scores in PGs (r = 0.16, 
p = 0.48). (D) Correlation of number of internal details in the EFT condition 
with age separate for HCs (r = −0.19, p = 0.42) and PGs (r = 0.16, p = 0.48).
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results
sample characteristics and Psychopathology
We tested 20 participants fulfilling the DSM-5 criteria of patho-
logical gambling [age mean (range) =  32.9 (19–59), 19 males] 
and 20 healthy control participants [age mean (range) =  32.55 
(18–58), 19 males]. All particpants of the pathological gambling 
group differed significantly from HC in both gambling-related 
questionnaires, KFG and SOGS (see Table 1). Due to the posi-
tive correlation between both measures (r = 0.63, p = 0.003), we 
aggregated them into a single “addiction severity” score for all 
subsequent analyses by averaging z-transformed values across 
all participants. PGs also had higher levels of depression (BDI) 
compared to HCs (see Table 1). Both groups did not differ with 
respect to age (t37.88 =  0.09, p =  0.93), completed school years 
(t38 = 0.74, p = 0.47), monthly income (t25.58 = 0.91, p = 0.37), 
nicotine (t37.84  =  1.12, p  =  0.27), and alcohol consumption 
(t37.07 = 1.45, p = 0.15).
episodic Future Thinking and  
autobiographical Memory
Autobiographical memory and EFT were assessed via a modified 
version of the Autobiographical Memory Interview [AMI (1)]. 
Narratives were recorded, transcribed, and scored according to 
the AMI manual by Levine et al. (1) (see Materials and Methods). 
Similar to previous studies, we collapsed across all episodic 
detail sub-categories (“Internal Event Details,” “Internal Place 
Details,” “Internal Time Details,” “Internal Perceptual Details,” 
and “Internal Emotion/Thought Details”) per participant by first 
averaging detail subcategory scores across the five event cues and 
then summing all mean detail scores (internal details sum score). 
This was done separately for AM and EFT. Internal detail sum 
scores were highly correlated between AM and EFT (HC: r = 0.86, 
p = < 0.001; PG: r = 0.95, p = < 0.001, see Figure 3A). Groups 
did not differ on internal details sum scores (EFT: t26.20 = −1.27, 
p =  0.21, see Figure 3B, AM: t26.71 = −1.18, p =  0.25) and the 
correlation of these measures with addiction severity in PG was 
not significant (EFT: r =  0.16, p =  0.48, see Figure  3C, AM: 
r = −0.03, p = 0.91). There was no correlation between internal 
details sum scores and age, neither in HCs (EFT: r = −0.19, 
p = 0.42, AM: r = −0.00, p = 0.98) nor in PGs (EFT: r = 0.16, 
p =  0.48, AM: r =  0.16, p =  0.50, see Figure  3D). Completed 
school years correlated with EFT internal details in HCs (r = 0.46, 
p = 0.04), but not in PGs (r = −0.06, p = 0.80). Groups did not 
differ on semantic detail scores (EFT: t30.91 = −0.95, p = 0.35, AM: 
t27.09 = −1.21, p = 0.24) and the correlation of semantic details 
scores with addiction severity was not significant (EFT: r = 0.20, 
p = 0.40, AM: r = 0.11, p = 0.66). There was no correlation between 
semantic details scores and age in HCs (EFT: r = 0.35, p = 0.13, 
AM: r = 0.26, p = 0.28), but in PGs (EFT: r = 0.46, p = 0.04, AM: 
r = 0.40, p = 0.08). Semantic detail scores did not correlate with 
completed school years in both HCs (r = 0.15, p = 0.53) and PGs 
(r = −0.07, p = 0.77).
Time Perception
Time perception was assessed using a circle-size adjustment task. 
Participants were instructed to adjust circle sizes according to 
the perceived length of delays (see Materials and Methods). Time 
perception data were fit individually for each participant with a 
linear model, a power model, and a quadratic model using MCMC 
sampling (see Materials and Methods), yielding a DIC value per 
participant and model. Note that smaller DIC values indicate a 
better model fit. DIC values were summed across participants for 
each model separately. In both groups, a power law provided the 
best fit to the time perception rating data (see Table 2). Neither 
scaling parameter a or the curvature parameter b nor the precision 
parameter π differed between groups (a: t35.50 = −0.08, p = 0.94; b: 
t35.48 = 0.36, p = 0.72; π: t37.58 = −0.54, p = 0.59).
circle-size rating
To control for possible non-linear circle-size perception, an 
additional circle-size rating task was included. Again, goodness 
of fit for linear, quadratic, and power functions to the circle-size 
ratings was quantified via summed DIC scores across participants 
for each model. In both groups, a power law best accounted 
for circle-size perception (see Table  2). Scaling parameter a, 
TaBle 2 | Model selection results: deviance information criterion (Dic) 
values of single participant model fits were summed across participants 
with respect to group.
analysis group Model summed Dic
Delay rating HC linear 2422.38
HC quadratic 2365.70
HC power 2303.22
PG linear 2482.85
PG quadratic 2388.26
PG power 2269.34
Circle rating HC linear 2633.41
HC quadratic 2573.48
HC power 2559.55
PG linear 2568.90
PG quadratic 2484.61
PG power 2463.32
Corrected delay 
rating
HC linear 2458.94
HC quadratic 2424.33
HC power 2387.85
PG linear 2401.46
PG quadratic 2348.61
PG power 2251.79
Smaller values are indicating a better model fit. Bold typeface is indicating the smallest 
value per comparison.
HC, healthy control participants, PG, pathological gamblers.
A B
FigUre 4 | (a) Group difference in the exponent b of the power law time 
perception (corrected by circle-size estimation). HC, healthy control partici- 
pants; PG, pathological gamblers. Error bars are indicating SEM. 
(B) Correlation of exponent b of the power law time perception (corrected by 
circle-size estimation) with addiction severity scores in PGs (r = 0.26, p = 0.26).
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curvature parameter b, and precision parameter π did not differ 
between groups (a: t36.45 = −0.71, p = 0.48; b: t37.42 = 0.48, p = 0.63, 
π: t24.37 = −1.27, p = 0.22).
Time Perception corrected by circle-size rating
The circle-size rating procedure revealed non-linear circle-size 
perception, that was, like the time perception data, best accounted 
for by a power law. To account for a possible influence of circle-
size perception on time perception ratings, the time perception 
ratings were corrected by first inverting the power law of the 
circle-size rating. We transformed the time perception ratings by 
the participant-specific parameters of the circle-size estimation:
 =  y
y
a
ˆ b
1
 (3)
where yˆ  is the corrected time perception rating, y is the original 
time perception rating, a is the participant-specific circle-size 
scaling parameter, and b is the participant-specific circle-size 
curvature parameter. Both a and b were obtained by fitting a 
power function to the results of the circle-size estimation pro-
cedure described above. Please note that data from participants 
that might have shown a linear circle rating will be transformed 
correctly (if b = 1, the power law becomes linear).
We repeated the same model selection procedure (linear, quad-
ratic, power) with the corrected time perception ratings. Note 
that these final ratings are corrected for potential non-linearities 
in circle-size perception. Again, a power model described the 
(corrected) time perception best (see Table  2). Scaling param-
eters a, curvature parameters b, and precision parameter π of the 
corrected time perceptions did not differ significantly between 
HCs and PGs (a: t37.97 = −0.16, p = 0.88; b: t35.14 = −0.48, p = 0.63; 
π: t28.60 = −1.76, p = 0.09; see Figure 4A). Within the PG group, 
neither a nor b correlated significantly with the addiction severity 
compound score (a: r = −0.03, p = 0.90, b: r = 0.26, p = 0.26, see 
Figure 4B).
Temporal Discounting
A hierarchical estimation of single participant k parameters was 
performed separately for the adaptive TD task and the Kirby task. 
The MCMC sampling estimates posterior distributions for every 
parameter and we used the median of the posterior as a summary 
measure for each participant’s posterior distribution. Because the 
distribution of k parameters in the sample was skewed, we applied 
a log-transformation to all k parameters. k parameters were highly 
correlated between the two discounting tasks in both groups 
(HC: r = 0.80, p < 0.001; PG: r = 0.87, p < 0.001). Therefore, we 
re-fited the combined datasets of both tasks for the remaining 
analyses. Again, we used the median as a summary measure of 
the posterior distribution and log-transformed all parameters to 
account for skewed parameter distributions.
Although k parameters were numerically greater in the PG 
group (see Figure 5A), the direct comparison was not significant 
(t36.09 = −1.15, p =  0.26, Cohen’s d = −0.36, see Figure  5A). 
Addiction severity did not correlate with k in PGs (r = −0.20, 
p = 0.40, see Figure 5B), which is consistent with prior research 
(10). β parameters, indicating decision noise, were not different 
between PGs and HCs (t37.52 = −0.66, p =  0.51). EFT internal 
details sum scores showed a non-significant trend-level correla-
tion with k parameters in the PG group (r = −0.41, p = 0.07). 
Thus, in the PG group, better EFT ability tended to be associated 
with less discounting. This correlation was not present in the 
control group (r = 0.07, p = 0.77, see Figure 5C), but a direct 
comparison of the two correlations revealed no significant differ-
ence (z = 1.57, p = 0.12). A stronger curvature of time perception 
showed a trend-level association with steeper TD across groups 
(r = −0.30, p = 0.06). However, examination of this correlation 
separately for each group revealed that it was driven by a stronger 
correlation in PGs (r = −0.50, p = 0.03) in comparison to HCs 
(r = −0.03, p = 0.90, see Figure 5D). However, the correlations 
did not differ significantly between groups (z = 1.5, p = 0.13).
Finally, we combined all measures [FTND, AUDIT, BDI, 
group (HC/PG) and time perception curvature parameter b] in 
a single multiple regression model with the dependent variable 
log(k). Only the parameters for the predictors BDI and group 
were significantly different from zero (BDI: b = −1.48, p = 0.01; 
FigUre 6 | Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of variables 
predicting log(k) temporal discounting parameters. b: exponent of the 
time perception function, AUDIT: Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test 
(68), FTND: Fagerström Test for Nicotine Dependence (63), BDI: Beck 
Depression Inventory (67), Group: healthy control participants vs. pathological 
gamblers, EFT: mean number of internal details in episodic future thinking. All 
variables were z-transformed before entering the regression analysis.
A
C
D
B
FigUre 5 | (a) Group difference in the log-transformed k parameter of the 
temporal discounting task. HC, healthy control participants, PG, pathological 
gamblers. Error bars are indicating SEM. (B) Correlation of log-transformed 
temporal discounting k parameters with addiction severity scores in PGs 
(r = −0.20, p = 0.40). (c) Correlation of the number of internal details in the 
episodic future thinking (EFT) condition with log-transformed temporal 
discounting parameters k separate for HCs (r = 0.07, p = 0.77) and PGs 
(r = −0.41, p = 0.07). (D) Correlation of exponent b of the power law time 
perception (corrected by circle-size estimation) with log-transformed temporal 
discounting parameters k across both groups (black, r = −0.30, p = 0.06) and 
separate for HCs (blue, r = −0.03, p = 0.90) and PGs (red, r = −0.50, p = 0.03).
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group: b = 2.65, p = 0.01; adjusted R2 = 0.20, see Figure 6). Thus, 
PG was associated with steeper discounting, whereas higher BDI 
was associated with reduced discounting.
Discussion
We explored associations between temporal discounting, episodic 
future thinking [as measured using the Autobiographical Memory 
Interview (1)] and time perception in pathological gamblers and 
matched healthy control participants. Based on recent findings 
of an association between prospection and discounting (49–52), 
we speculated that impulsive choice in PG (i.e., steep reward dis-
counting) might in part be attributable to attenuated prospection 
abilities. However, groups did not differ in baseline prospection 
(i.e., episodic future thinking internal details scores). In both 
groups, time perception was best accounted by a power law, and 
the degree of non-linearity in time perception correlated with 
temporal discounting across groups. A final multiple regression 
analysis across all predictors revealed that only group status (PG/
healthy control participants) and depression, but not episodic 
future thinking or autobiographical memory, were significantly 
associated with discounting behavior.
In line with the conceptual framework of constructive episodic 
simulation (29, 30) and consistent with previous findings (29, 35), 
episodic future thinking (EFT) was highly correlated with auto-
biographical memory (AM) in pathological gamblers (PGs) and 
healthy control participants (HCs) alike. Neither EFT nor AM 
differed between groups, and neither correlated with addiction 
severity in the PG group. Psychiatric disorders such as autism 
(40), post-traumatic stress disorder (41), and schizophrenia (42) 
have been associated with changes in EFT. We hypothesized that 
impulsive choice behavior in addiction and PG could be in part 
explained by less detailed imaginations of the future. The present 
study suggests that PG may not be associated with similar impair-
ments. Of note, PG was taken as a model for human addiction 
that is not confounded by effects of neuro-toxic substances (25, 
86). However, it is possible that EFT and/or AM deficits might be 
more pronounced in SUDs. A recent study by Mercuri et al. (46) 
found EFT, but not AM, impairments in long-term opiate users. In 
alcohol abuse, neuro-toxic effects of heavy alcohol consumption 
can lead to Korsakoff ’s syndrome, which includes memory impair-
ments (87). These memory impairments might impact EFT as well.
Across groups, more vivid EFT was not associated with 
reduced TD. However, a greater number of EFT details tended 
to be associated with less impulsive TD in PGs. In a previous 
study using a very similar approach, individual differences in EFT 
predicted discounting behavior in a sample of healthy adolescents 
after controlling for questionnaire-based impulsivity, intelligence, 
development, autobiographic memory, and semantic future 
details (49). This finding suggests a specific impact of future event 
imaginations on future decision-making in healthy adolescents. 
Although the regression coefficient for EFT was not significantly 
different from zero, it was overall negative as in the previous study 
(49). This previous finding provides evidence for a relation of vivid 
EFT and shallow TD, which could not be replicated in the present 
sample of healthy adults. Future studies with larger samples 
are required to explore how AMI-based prospection measures 
relate to discounting behavior in healthy adults. Furthermore, it 
remains unclear why the association between discounting and 
EFT appeared to be more pronounced in PGs than HCs. Prior 
research found evidence for subtypes of PG (88, 89), including a 
subtype summarized as “antisocial impulsivist” [e.g., Ref. (90–92)]. 
Although the present sample size precludes us from investigating 
PG subtypes, one could speculate that this subtype that is associ-
ated with feelings of enhancement, could lead to more extensive 
narrations, which might mask other effects in the present study.
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Episodic future thinking depends on a brain network consisting 
of the medial temporal lobe, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the 
retrosplenial cortex/posterior cingulate (34–36). Valuation signals 
of immediate and delayed rewards have been observed in the ven-
tral striatum and ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (76), while the 
specific changes of valuation signals in the ventral striatum in PG 
are still debated (16–19). Growing evidence supports the idea that 
vivid EFT can attenuate TD under some conditions (50–52, 93). 
Prefrontal–medio-temporal interactions have been identified to 
support these changes in TD behavior (50, 51). The present results 
of our study are not in line with the hypothesis that steep TD in 
PG might be due to attenuated EFT. Moreover, if anything, PGs 
showed numerically greater internal details scores than controls.
Since the primary aim of the present study was an assessment 
of baseline EFT capabilities in PG, EFT and TD were tested in two 
separate tasks. However, the lack of overall group differences in EFT 
does not rule out the possibility that EFT–TD interactions might 
be diminished in PG under different task conditions. For example, 
it is unclear if PGs show effects of episodic tagging (cueing) during 
discounting, which have been repeatedly shown in HCs (50–52, 
56, 93). Such beneficial effects of EFT on TD would be of interest 
for the development of novel therapeutic approaches for PG. Since 
the present results suggest that EFT is not generally impaired in 
PG, this might be an interesting avenue for future research.
We replicated previous findings of non-linear time percep-
tion [power law (57, 58)] in both PGs and HCs. We applied a 
novel task, utilizing a non-linear rating procedure via circle-size 
adjustments. This enabled us to disentangle general circle-size 
perception from delay perception. Scaling and curvature param-
eters of the power law describing delay perception did not differ 
between groups and were not correlated with addiction severity 
in the PGs. The finding of non-linear time perception in both 
groups suggests that TD differences between HCs and PGs are 
unlikely to be attributable to differences in delay perception. By 
contrast, time perception deficits have been reported for SUD 
when estimating shorter time spans [<1 min (61)]. Additionally, 
we explored whether steep TD in PGs might be (in part) related to 
shortened time horizons. In line with prior research, attenuated 
non-linear time perception was associated with steeper discount-
ing across both groups (57, 58). Although this effect appeared to 
be driven by a stronger effect in the PG group, the correlations 
did not differ significantly. Steeper TD in PG can therefore also 
not be explained by shortened time perception. It has been argued 
that interventions that use EFT to reduce TD might lengthen 
participants’ subjective time horizons (such that options with 
longer delays are taken more into account) rather than shifting 
valence or attentiveness of the delayed rewards (56). Although 
this might be relevant to studies examining effects of EFT directly 
during decision tasks [e.g., Ref. (50)], it is not directly relevant to 
our study, as we assessed TD and EFT separately.
Temporal discounting behavior was assessed using two tasks: 
first, an adaptive task using a staircase procedure was applied (76). 
Second, a standard task by Kirby et al. (6) using 27 fixed trials was 
performed. k parameters estimated from both tasks were highly 
correlated, reflecting the high reliability of k parameters. After con-
trolling for smoking behavior (FTND), alcohol use (AUDIT), non-
linearity of time perception (exponent b), and EFT episodic details, 
only depression (as measured by the BDI) and group status (HC/
PG) significantly predicted TD. The group difference was absent 
in a direct comparison of k parameters between groups in a t-test, 
likely due to masking effects of the covariates, which are removed 
in the regression analysis. Higher BDI scores were associated with 
lower k parameters while PG group status was associated with 
higher k parameters. Similar to PG, which is consistently associ-
ated with impulsive TD (9–12), major depressive disorder and 
bipolar disorder both have been associated with steeper discount-
ing (94–97) and it has been speculated that this might reflect a state 
of hopelessness (94, 95). Depression is a common co-morbidity in 
PG (98) and might differentially affect reward processing in PG. A 
recent study by Fauth-Bühler et al. (99) found a positive interaction 
of PG and depression on reward signals in the right insular cortex 
and in the ventral striatum during an effort-dependent monetary 
reward task. This finding indicates a possible interaction of depres-
sion and PG in reward processing on a neuronal level. However, 
these interactions might not always manifest in behavioral dif-
ferences (99). In our study, only PG and depression significantly 
influenced discounting behavior. However, the directions of effect 
were opposed, as PG intensified TD and depression attenuated TD.
Specific TD testing conditions might have affected our results. 
All smaller-but-sooner options were immediate offers, which 
might lead to more impulsive choices [a phenomenon known 
as the immediacy effect (100)]. All TD rewards in our study 
were hypothetical. It has been shown that real rewards lead to 
attenuated discounting behavior (101–103). How this effect 
might interact with PG is unclear, but earlier studies found group 
differences between HC and PG using (potentially) real rewards 
(11, 104). Additionally, the role of reward magnitudes remains to 
be explored, both with respect to effects in PG and with respect 
to EFT modulations. It is possible that experiments using larger 
reward magnitudes (>1000 EUR) might be more sensitive to 
detect correlations with EFT and/or time perception.
Taken together, EFT and AM were highly correlated in both 
healthy control participants and pathological gamblers, and 
neither process was impaired in the pathological gamblers. 
Likewise, we found no evidence for changes in anticipatory delay 
perception in pathological gambling. These findings suggest that 
steep discounting in pathological gambling is unlikely to be due 
to impairments in general prospection abilities or due to skewed 
representations of time delays. If anything, gamblers produced 
more future event details than controls. Interactions between EFT 
and TD remain an important issue for future research in addic-
tion neuroscience and psychiatry. Further studies are required 
to assess whether the present findings extend to substance-use 
disorders and other disorders of impulse control that are charac-
terized by impulsive and short-sighted behavior.
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